



**A-level
HISTORY**

**Component 2S The Making of Modern Britain,
1951–2007**

7042/2S

Wednesday 13 June 2018 Afternoon

Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes

For this paper you must have:
• **an AQA 16-page answer book.**

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INSTRUCTIONS

- **Use black ink or black ball-point pen.**
- **Write the information required on the front of your answer book. The PAPER REFERENCE is 7042/2S.**
- **Answer THREE questions.**
In SECTION A answer Question 01.
In SECTION B answer TWO questions.

INFORMATION

- **The marks for questions are shown in brackets.**
- **The maximum mark for this paper is 80.**
- **You will be marked on your ability to:**
 - **use good English**
 - **organise information clearly**
 - **use specialist vocabulary where appropriate.**

ADVICE

- **You are advised to spend about:**
 - **60 minutes on Question 01**
 - **45 minutes on each of the two questions in Section B.**

DO NOT TURN OVER UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO

SECTION A**Answer Question 01.****SOURCE A**

From an article written for the Bruges Group, a Eurosceptic organisation based in the UK, 1997. The group is independent, although often associated with the Conservative Party.

John Major became the Conservative Party leader in 1990 because he was the ideal compromise candidate. A healer, not a warrior, he had to prevent European issues upsetting domestic politics. But, when it mattered, Major was a Euro-enthusiast who was prepared to divide and discipline his party to the point of bitter conflict. The Conservative Party became, behind the facade of unity, totally split from top to bottom over Europe. Major's European policy corroded the fabric of the party and eroded its ability to sustain its term of office. He defied public opinion during the period 1990 to 1997 as it moved decisively in a more Euro-sceptical direction. So great was the frustration and bitterness felt by many of the normally loyal membership, that this created a sense of grassroots alienation from the leadership quite without precedent in the party's history.

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**Formerly diehard party workers departed in droves. Donations and subscriptions collapsed. 20
Ultimately, Major's European policy contributed mightily to his election defeat.**

[Turn over]

SOURCE B

From the diaries of Philip Gould, a key electoral strategist and polling advisor to the Labour Party in 1997, published 1998. Gould was a close colleague of Tony Blair.

Labour had won an extraordinary victory. Most satisfying for me, 1.8 million Conservative voters in 1992 were estimated to have switched to Labour in 1997. This scale of direct switching was at the heart of New Labour's election strategy. Labour, a party almost dead in 1983, was now reborn. 5

Labour did not win in 1997; New Labour did. Only when Labour had been completely modernised could dissatisfaction with the Conservatives be turned into positive support for us; nor would white-collar workers have moved to Labour in such huge numbers; nor would Labour have won back the great mass of working-class support which had switched to Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and 1983. 10

Among all social classes, it was the fact that Labour had become New Labour that gave people the confidence to make the change. New Labour was the last line of defence against people's fears and memories of Old Labour, their images of extremism and failure. It was a line that held. 15 20

SOURCE C

From John Major's autobiography, 1999.

There was deep national impatience with our party. We all felt it – much more, I think, than we sensed any surge of enthusiasm for the alternative. Labour did not win the election for themselves: they won because we started as losers. There was a feeling that we had been in power too long. The feeling was amplified many times by the bickering, squabbling and backstabbing that now afflicted Conservatism almost like a death-wish, and which did more damage to our prospects than Tony Blair could have dreamed of doing. Although many of these stories were exaggerated, and some invented, they had enabled Labour to tie together 'Tory' and 'sleaze' as a daily mantra. It soon became clear that our campaign did not ring true on the doorstep; despite the plausibility of our diagnosis, our 'New Labour: New Danger' approach did not work. Quite simply, the voters had fallen out of love with us, though the notion that Britain in 1997 was racked by anxiety over Europe is pure nonsense.

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- 01** With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the reasons why Labour won the 1997 election. [30 marks]

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SECTION B

Answer TWO questions.

0 2 To what extent was Labour Party policy directly responsible for the growth of trade union militancy in the years 1964 to 1970? [25 marks]

0 3 'The achievements of the feminist movement in the 1970s did not amount to a social revolution.'

Assess the validity of this view. [25 marks]

0 4 'Tony Blair's foreign policy in the years 2001 to 2007 failed on all counts.'

Assess the validity of this view. [25 marks]

END OF QUESTIONS

There are no questions printed on this page

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