



Cambridge International Examinations
Cambridge Pre-U Certificate

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY (PRINCIPAL)

9774/02

Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1

May/June 2016

2 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet/Paper



READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet.

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO NOT WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

Choose **one** of Topics 1 to 4.

Answer **two** questions.

You must answer **both** parts of the question in Section A and **one** question from Section B for the Topic you have chosen.

You should divide your time equally between the questions you attempt.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

The syllabus is approved for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as a Cambridge International Level 3 Pre-U Certificate.

This document consists of **6** printed pages and **2** blank pages.

Choose **one** of Topics 1 to 4.

Answer **two** questions.

You must answer **both** parts of the question in Section A and **one** question from Section B for the Topic you have chosen.

You should divide your time equally between the questions you attempt.

Topic 1 Epistemology

Answer Question 1 **and** either Question 2 **or** Question 3.

Section A

- Philonous ... I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities or any sensible object whatever to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.
- Hylas If it comes to that, the point will soon be decided. What is more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.
- Philonous What are you saying, Hylas – can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?
- Hylas No, that would be a contradiction.
- Philonous Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of *conceiving* a thing which is *unconceived*?
- Hylas It is.
- Philonous The tree or house, therefore, which you think of is conceived by you.
- Hylas How should it be otherwise?
- Philonous And what is conceived is surely in the mind.
- Hylas Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.
- Philonous How then did you come to say you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?
- Hylas That was, I admit, an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it. It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place where no one was present to see it, I thought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of, not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them *existing out of the minds of all spirits*.
- Philonous You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind.
- Hylas I do.
- Philonous And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive.
- Hylas I profess I do not know what to think, but still some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I see things at a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is this not, I say, manifest to the senses?
- Philonous Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?
- Hylas I do.
- Philonous And do they not then have the same appearance of being distant?
- Hylas They have.
- Philonous But you do not then conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?
- Hylas By no means.
- Philonous You ought not therefore conclude that sensible objects are without the mind from their appearance or in manner which they are perceived.

[Extract from **George Berkeley**: *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists*: Cahn, 729–730]

3

- 1 (a) With reference to this passage, explain Berkeley's argument that material objects cannot exist outside the mind. [10]
- (b) 'Berkeley's argument that material objects cannot exist outside the mind is nonsense.' Discuss. [15]

Section B

- 2 Evaluate the claim that Descartes' method of doubt provides us with knowledge that is certain. [25]

OR

- 3 Critically assess representative realism as a theory of perception. [25]

Topic 2 Philosophical and Theological Language

Answer Question 4 **and** either Question 5 **or** Question 6.

Section A

We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgements in which they occur. So far we are in agreement with the absolutists. But, unlike the absolutists, we are able to give an explanation of this fact about ethical concepts. We say that the reason why they are unanalysable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.

If now I generalize my previous statement and say, 'Stealing money is wrong,' I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning – that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written 'Stealing money!!' – where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false. Another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feelings about stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my moral sentiments. But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me. For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition.

[Extract from **A. J. Ayer**: *Language, Truth and Logic*: 109–111]

- 4 (a) With reference to this passage, explain Ayer's view that ethical concepts are 'mere pseudo-concepts'. [10]
- (b) Critically assess Ayer's emotivist view of ethics. [15]

Section B

- 5 'Religious language is true.' Discuss. [25]

OR

- 6 Critically assess the claim that to understand God we must use symbolic language. [25]

Topic 3 Philosophy of Religion

Answer Question 7 **and** either Question 8 **or** Question 9.

Section A

THEODICY VERSUS HELL

If this is the true nature of Christian theodicy – a theodicy that is eschatological in character and can be affirmed only by faith – it compels us to question the validity of belief in hell, in the traditional sense of eternal suffering inflicted by God upon those of His creatures who have sinfully rejected Him. For there is a tension within Christian thought between the motives that move towards this doctrine of everlasting punishment and the motives that move towards a theodicy. The sufferings of the damned in hell, since they are interminable, can never lead to any constructive end beyond themselves and are thus the very type of ultimately wasted and pointless anguish. Indeed misery which is eternal and therefore infinite would constitute the largest part of the problem of evil. Further, the notion of hell is no less fatal to theodicy if, instead of stressing the sufferings of the damned, we stress the fact that they are unendingly in sin. For this is presumably an even greater evil – a greater frustration of the divine purpose – than their misery. Thus in a universe that permanently contained sin, good and evil would be co-ordinates, and God's creation would be perpetually shadowed and spoiled by evil; and this would be incompatible either with God's sovereignty or with His perfect goodness. For the doctrine of hell has as its implied premise either that God does not desire to save all His human creatures, in which case He is only limitedly good, or that His purpose has finally failed in the case of some – and indeed, according to the theological tradition, most – of them, in which case He is only limitedly sovereign. I therefore believe that the needs of Christian theodicy compel us to repudiate the idea of eternal punishment.

Does this mean that we are led to universalism, in the sense of a belief in the ultimate salvation of all human souls? The rejection of the idea of a divine sentence of eternal suffering is not in itself equivalent to universalism, for there remains the third possibility of either the divine annihilation or the dwindling out of existence of the finally lost. In this case there would not be eternally useless and unredeemed suffering such as is entailed by the notion of hell as unending torment; and in working out a theodicy it would perhaps be possible to stop at this point. However, even in such a modified version of a 'bad eschaton' God's good purpose would have failed in the case of all those souls whose fate is extinction. To this extent evil would have prevailed over good and would have permanently marred God's creation. This is accordingly a very dubious doctrine for Christian theism to sponsor, and not one in which we should acquiesce except for want of any viable alternative. But in fact an alternative is available: namely, that God will eventually succeed in His purpose of winning all men to Himself in faith and love. That this is indeed God's purpose in relation to man is surely evident from the living revelation of that purpose in Jesus Christ.

[Extract from **John Hick**: *Evil and the God of Love*: 341–342]

- 7 (a) With reference to this passage, explain Hick's argument that Christian theodicy should abandon belief in hell in favour of the belief that eventually all people will come to God in faith and love. [10]
- (b) Critically assess Hick's view that Christians should abandon belief in hell. [15]

Section B

- 8 'To accept the ontological argument is to abandon common sense.' Evaluate this claim. [25]

OR

- 9 Critically assess the implications of sociological understandings of religious belief. [25]

Topic 4 New Testament: The Four Gospels

Answer Question 10 **and** either Question 11 **or** Question 12.

Section A

¹³ Pilate then called together the chief priests, the leaders, and the people, ¹⁴ and said to them, ‘You brought me this man as one who was perverting the people; and here I have examined him in your presence and have not found this man guilty of any of your charges against him. ¹⁵ Neither has Herod, for he sent him back to us. Indeed, he has done nothing to deserve death. ¹⁶ I will therefore have him flogged and release him.’

¹⁷ ¹⁸ Then they all shouted out together, ‘Away with this fellow! Release Barabbas for us!’ ¹⁹ (This was a man who had been put in prison for an insurrection that had taken place in the city, and for murder.) ²⁰ Pilate, wanting to release Jesus, addressed them again; ²¹ but they kept shouting, ‘Crucify, crucify him!’ ²² A third time he said to them, ‘Why, what evil has he done? I have found in him no ground for the sentence of death; I will therefore have him flogged and then release him.’ ²³ But they kept urgently demanding with loud shouts that he should be crucified; and their voices prevailed. ²⁴ So Pilate gave his verdict that their demand should be granted. ²⁵ He released the man they asked for, the one who had been put in prison for insurrection and murder, and he handed Jesus over as they wished.

[Luke 23: 13–25]

10 (a) With reference to this passage, examine who was responsible for Jesus’ crucifixion. [10]

(b) Critically assess the claims made about Jesus’ death. [15]

Section B

11 Critically assess the view that Jesus’ teaching only related to the outcast and the oppressed. [25]

OR

12 Examine the issues surrounding the authorship, date and purpose of one of the gospels. [25]

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