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Cambridge Pre-U Certificate

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MARK SCHEME

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Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 1 Epistemology</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
<p>[Extract from <b>David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding</b>: Section VIII, 'Of Liberty and Necessity', Section 89, p. 81]</p> <p><b>With reference to this passage and to Hume's views on free will:</b></p> <p><b>Explain Hume's argument concerning the compatibility of free will ('liberty') and determinism ('necessity').</b></p>		
1(a)	<p>Hume begins the discussion with the ideas contained in the passage, that the debate about free will and determinism is simply a matter of various philosophers being careless about defining their terminology. We are used to finding necessary causal laws in nature, but this really is a matter of the observation of constant conjunction between events and the determination of human minds: the necessary causal connection is assumed but not observed. Similarly, human nature across all cultures can be understood as behaving in accordance with regularities, laws and principles, so for example a farmer would not cultivate crops and sell the produce if he did not expect others to pay a fair price. The doctrine of liberty, however, is also acknowledged by all people to be true. By 'liberty', Hume means a power of acting or not acting according to the determination of the will: the ability to act in accordance with what the will chooses. Unless someone is physically disabled, for example, a person who wills himself to raise his arm is at liberty to do so. Liberty should properly be contrasted with constraint (being unable/constrained not to obey one's will) and not with necessity.</p>	<b>10</b>
<b>Critically assess Hume's compatibilist argument.</b>		
1(b)	<p>The backdrop of Hume's compatibilist argument is the difficult question of whether or not all events, including mental events, are causally determined: is there any room for the freedom of the will? This is particularly important, for example in ethics, where ideas about responsibility, merit and punishment are predicated on the view that people are free to make their own moral choices. Candidates will probably give an overview of incompatibilist theories – e.g. the libertarian thesis that freedom and determinism are incompatible, and that determinism is false; 'hard' determinism, that physical determinism necessitates that freedom is illusory; and compatibilism, e.g. Hume's thesis that freedom requires determinism, so the two are compatible. Hume's view is that our concept of determinism relies on constant conjunction – it is our perception of events that sees them as being causally necessitated. Freedom is not the ability to have acted otherwise; rather it is the ability to act in accordance with the will.</p> <p>Candidates might defend Hume's compatibilism from an ethical standpoint: for example the combination of necessity and freedom seems in one sense necessary for moral action: without necessity, there would be no regularity in human behaviour and without that regularity we could not formulate the moral laws that are necessary for human society.</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	Some might defend compatibilism by arguing that although there is a causal chain going back into the past, God has built human will into that causal chain, for example through divine omniscience; although this might be seen as a rather odd approach to causality, not least in its employment of the concept of God. Some compatibilists extend Hume's ideas to include the notion of random factors in mental events at the quantum mechanical level, thus allowing the moral agent (for example) some degree of freedom. Some might refer to Dennett's 'decision generator' model of compatibilism. Some might argue that Hume's entire concepts are incoherent here: if physical determinism is true, then the notion of an ability to act within the boundaries of one's own desires is empty.	

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
<b>'Global scepticism is the only reasonable answer to our lack of understanding of the world.'</b> <b>Discuss</b>		
2	<p>Candidates are likely to begin with a definition of global scepticism as doubt about everything / hyperbolic doubt. Some are likely to connect it with the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, in order to illustrate that no attempt to show that we have knowledge succeeds. GS is not a claim that nothing can be known; nor is it a claim that all our beliefs are false; rather it is the claim that no attempt to show that we have any knowledge succeeds, since all attempts to justify knowledge fail. Candidates are likely to illustrate this through the failure of foundationalist and other attempts at justification, and perhaps through the epistemic Principle of Closure.</p> <p>Candidates might decide, in rejection of GS, that some system of justification is good enough / as close as we are likely to get. For example Reliabilists reject both the Principle of Closure and the sceptic's demand for infallible justification; although the sceptic can reply that such rejection is arbitrary and does not meet the global sceptic's requirements for demonstrating knowledge. Some might refer to Ryle's argument that the idea of 'error' entails the correctness of some concepts, although the global sceptic is likely to be unimpressed with such a claim, since, for example, just having the idea that sometimes we get it right does not guarantee that we ever do get it right. Some might refer to Wittgenstein's argument that scepticism arises from a confusion of ordinary language: so, for example, to doubt that 'this is a hand' means that I must doubt that the word 'hand' has any meaning; but if I do doubt the meaning of the words I use then I can't put into words what it is that I'm doubting, so GS is literally meaningless. Some might retort that this is tantamount to a claim that 'this is a hand' is analytic, which can hardly be true. GS does find it difficult to justify scepticism about analytic truths: these are concepts, and once a concept is understood, it is hard to see how I can be mistaken.</p> <p>Candidates might use any of these arguments to conclude whether or not GS is a 'reasonable' answer to the problem of our lack of understanding of the world.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<p><b>‘The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.’ (Berkeley: ‘Principles of Knowledge’.)</b></p> <p><b>Critically examine Berkeley’s idealist philosophy that material objects are simply ideas in the mind.</b></p>		
3	<p>Candidates are likely to begin with an overview of Berkeley’s idealism, that reality is primarily mind-dependent. Material objects have to be perceived in order to exist: <i>esse est percipi (aut percipere)</i> – <i>to be is to be perceived (or to perceive)</i>, so MOs cannot exist independently of minds. Berkeley’s views follow from a rejection of both naïve and representative realism, and argue that both primary and secondary qualities are in the mind: MOs are bundles of ideas that we have learned to associate with each other. In response to the problem of what causes perceptions, Berkeley introduces the mind of God as the explanation of why our perceptions are so systematic. Perceptions can’t be caused by ideas, since ideas are passive; neither can they be caused by my mind: if we compare perception with imagination, for example, the latter is controlled by the self, whereas perception clearly is not. According to Berkeley, the existence of God as the cause of perceptions is hardly as odd as some make out, since no other approach has been able to show how MOs cause our ideas and experience. Some might argue that the difficulties experienced by realist theories of perception do not require the abandonment of realism. Candidates might raise any issues for discussion relevant to Berkeley; for example his treatment of illusions such as a stick appearing to be bent in water. The realist will argue that illusions are mis-perceptions: the stick appears bent because there is a difference between my perception and the real world, so the real world must exist. Berkeley argues simply that there isn’t a real world in which the stick is not bent – all there is is my perception, in which the stick <i>looks</i> bent.</p> <p>Again, candidates are at liberty to examine any of Berkeley’s claims: judge by coherence of argument. Some might suggest that in terms of quantum mechanics, a description of MOs does not need to refer to perceptual properties, since electrons / quarks / strings and their qualities lie beyond our perceptual range and are accessible only by mathematics; although one reply to this might be that the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics requires that the collapse of the wave function of a system requires observation. What Berkeley might make of that would make interesting reading.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 2 Philosophical and Theological Language</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
<p>[Extract from <b>J.L. Mackie</b>: 'Evil and Omnipotence', ch.V in Basil Mitchell: <i>The Philosophy of Religion</i>, pp.92–93]</p> <p><b>With reference to this passage and to Mackie's views on evil and omnipotence:</b></p> <p><b>Explain Mackie's views about the problem of evil and omnipotence.</b></p>		
4(a)	<p>Mackie considers four responses from theologians, and replies to each. First is the response that good cannot exist without evil – evil is a necessary counterpart to good. Mackie denies this, and argues that it could only work if there were just enough evil (and no more) for goodness to exist. There is far more evil than is needed for goodness to exist. Second is the solution that evil exists as a means to good: evil is the means of producing certain types of good, for example the second-order goods of sympathy and empathy, courage and love, as a response to evil in the world. Mackie replies that it is logically possible to obtain such goods without the existence of evil, so God lacks omnipotence. Third is the argument that the universe is better with some evil in it. The existence of ugliness enhances the value of aesthetic considerations. Further, a world in which evil exists but is defeated eventually by moral progress is superior to a world in which only goodness exists, since it produces the goods mentioned above, for example. Mackie replies that this works only for evils like pain and disease, but many evils are not required for important goods to accrue, e.g. cowardice. Fourth, theologians argue that freedom is a higher-order good, and evil is a misuse of freedom. It is better for God to create a world of free creatures, with evil, than unfree creatures without it. Mackie argues that an omnipotent God must be able to instantiate any number of beings who will always freely choose the good. He has not, so he is not omnipotent or else is not good.</p>	<b>10</b>
<b>Critically assess Mackie's objections to solutions to the problem of evil.</b>		
4(b)	<p>Candidates can address all of Mackie's solutions or else some in more detail. There is no requirement for each issue to be treated separately, since to an extent they overlap. Mackie's formulation of the free will defence is a good one, but one of his central objections (that God could have instantiated any number of free people who would always freely choose the good) is focal, since it raises many questions about which Mackie is right to say that theologians are not clear: for example the issue of whether or not an omnipotent being can do the logically impossible. If he can, then there is no excuse for the existence of evil. Mackie is subtle here, since the thesis that people could always freely choose the good refers to the person of Jesus, who Christians might believe to be an instance of one such freely-choosing being. If God can instantiate just one such being, then he has a blueprint for instantiating any number of such beings. Responses to this might reject Mackie's argument that God could have made everything red (as in the same way that he could have made everyone free and good) – we would simply never have known the difference. This might not be a good argument, since red is part of a colour spectrum, so can hardly exist without the whole spectrum. Judge responses by quality of the discussion of Mackie's points.</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
<b>Critically assess the claim that a sentence is factually significant if, and only if, there is some form of evidence which could falsify it.</b>		
5	<p>This is the claim of the falsification principle. Candidates might trace its credentials from Popper's analysis of scientific theories, in which he argued that science does not move from observation to theory, but goes the other way round: scientific theories are considered to be true until proven wrong. For the FP the test of a meaningful sentence is that it must assert something that could be falsifiable under certain circumstances. The sentence, 'Atoms move because they are pushed by small, invisible, non-material demons' is meaningless, because the demons in question cannot be proven false using any test. Applied to religious statements, Anthony Flew used Wisdom's Parable of the Gardener to assert that grand religious assertions such as 'God loves x' are meaningless, since the believer will allow nothing to count against that belief. In effect, then, the believer asserts nothing at all.</p> <p>There are a number of replies that candidates might give to this. Some will defend the FP on materialist / empirical grounds, and will agree that it renders religious statements meaningless, perhaps in association with the verification principle. Some might refer to Hare's argument that religious statements are not like scientific statements, but are meaningful, non-falsifiable <i>bliks</i>, so religious statements are not required to be factually significant. Others might refer to Mitchell's Parable of the Stranger, where trust in God is cognitive/factual on the analogy of trust in a stranger, despite the believer's propensity to qualify his beliefs. Similarly Hick's Parable of the Celestial City maintains that religious beliefs are cognitive / factually significant eschatologically, although there are problems with Hick's view in so far as eschatological verification cannot be falsified if it is false (you won't wake up in the afterlife to know religion was false). The discussion could take several lines: some might argue that some religious statements are literal/factual whereas others are non-cognitive, and that different criteria of meaning apply to different forms of statement.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Consider the claim that to describe God we must use the language of analogy.</b>		
6	<p>In considering the doctrine of analogy, candidates are likely to focus on Aquinas' discussion of univocal and equivocal language, together with his conclusion that the main thrust of language about God is analogical. The doctrine of analogical predication holds that since God created the universe, then there must be a link between human attributes and the divine attributes. Candidates are likely to illustrate Aquinas' view through the analogies of attribution and proportion. This might appear to be a useful way of looking at the language we use about God: Paley used analogy to construct his design argument for the existence of the God, and it figures in other formulations, for example Swinburne's argument from spatial order. There are several problems with analogy, however. Some argue that the analogy of attribution can be used to show negative attributes in connection with God (e.g. God has whatever it takes to produce badness in humans). Aquinas covered this by arguing that evil is not a thing in itself, although that is arguably a weak response. Another problem is that in order to understand the analogy, the language itself has to be understood univocally in some way, so nothing is gained. Swinburne's account of analogy sidesteps this issue, using the wave-particle duality in quantum mechanics to argue that words like 'person' when applied to God can be 'stretched' in the same way that understanding light as both a wave and a particle stretches the ordinary use of language.</p> <p>The question format implies that candidates might select other forms of language in connection with God if we cannot make do with analogy, so candidates might make such suggestions, perhaps with regard to symbolic language, for example.</p>	25



Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 3 Philosophy of Religion</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
<p>[Extract from <b>John Polkinghorne</b>: <i>Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding</i>: Ch.12, Section 89, pp.254–256]</p> <p><b>With reference to this passage and to Polkinghorne’s views on order and disorder:</b></p> <p><b>Explain Polkinghorne’s view that the world is ‘more open to innovation in its process and more dangerously precarious in its possible outcome’.</b></p>		
7(a)	<p>Polkinghorne explains that at the beginning of the universe, the primeval order was perfect, and became fragmented to the lesser order that we see today. We live in a domain within the universe where the anthropic conditions are right (they are conducive to life and development because they are ordered) whereas elsewhere they might be disordered. We exist somewhere between the fundamental physics of the very large and the very small: around the geometric mean of the length scale. This ‘mean’ is one of both order and disorder. Where order increases in a system, as it does in our system, this produces greater complexity, but it also produces greater suffering. Some scientists talk about humans as ‘survival machines’ – as robotic beings whose actions are dictated by the ‘selfish gene’; but as Keith Ward says, this kind of attitude to humans and the world is grotesque: it is a failure to grasp the nature of man if we can see in man nothing more than a genetic survival machine.</p> <p>The flow of time in the universe is from order to disorder: systems are entropic; nevertheless the universe is emerging / becoming: it has an element both of randomness and of ontological openness. Humans and other life-forms are anti-entropic: we should consider the “marvellous order of living beings”. It is interesting that small fluctuations in natural processes can lead to stability: order, in other words, can arise from chaos. Order and chaos are <i>complementary</i>: the presence of one implies the other. This generates also the universe that we see: chance can lead to the evolution of redundant or malfunctioning life forms [such as the dinosaurs] or more successful beings such as ourselves. Think of the ‘astonishing fruitfulness’ revealed as inherent in the laws of atomic physics: the fact that they have such amazing consequences as human beings shows the amazing potential contained in such a structure. Chance becomes necessity in the various interactions of the processes of the world. Physical evil is a by-product of the evolving interaction between chance and necessity. Increasing complexity opens the world to the possibility of good and evil of all kinds, but these are natural processes. The kind of God this reveals is not the organiser of the divine clockwork universe contemplated by Newtonian physics, but a God who opens the world to constant innovation in its processes, where the possible outcomes can be precarious and dangerous.</p>	<b>10</b>



Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Critically assess Polkinghorne's view that order and disorder being entwined in the universe shows that God is upholding the universe.</b>		
7(b)	<p>There is some degree of similarity between Polkinghorne's comments on the intertwining of order and disorder with the theodicy of Process theology. As with Process theology, the world is seen as being emergent, in the sense that the future is genuinely open-ended: it is not a 'clockwork' system in which God's inexorable plans are worked out against the backdrop of obedient humanity. Humans are involved in the processes of becoming: they are anti-entropic / highly-ordered biological systems, and their situation, in the midst of order and chaos, indicates that they have a certain power to shape their destiny. God is facilitative, not coercive. Hence Polkinghorne refers approvingly to Teilhard de Chardin's comment that within the setting of the evolutionary processes, evil ceases to become an incomprehensible feature of the world and becomes instead a natural feature of it. Candidates might suggest that this is neither a majority view among theists nor a particularly coherent view, since being a natural feature of a <i>theistic</i> world, believers might expect God to be more careful in what he creates and just how much order the system can tolerate without overload. Dismissing the extinction of species (such as the dinosaurs) seems a rather arbitrary way of conducting affairs for an all-powerful God, and Polkinghorne's portrait of God elsewhere in the book does not imply a limited being. On the other hand, like Process theologians, Polkinghorne is seeking, in this chapter, to take a realistic view of evil by arguing that it is the inevitable product of the interplay of the forces of order and disorder. The 'upholding' that God does might seem more deistic in tone than Polkinghorne's theistic leanings. Judge by quality of argument in response to the question.</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
<b>Critically assess the view that the ontological argument is only a matter for faith.</b>		
8	<p>Candidates are likely to approach the faith value from the writings of Karl Barth, who considered that Anselm's version of the ontological argument was the result of a religious experience on Anselm's part during which he had the revelation that God was 'that than which none greater can be conceived'. Barth also points out that at the start of the argument in <i>Proslogion</i>, Anselm uses the form of a prayer. On this view, then, Anselm's OA was not intended to be a watertight deductive argument, but was Anselm's response in faith to what was given through faith. Given the notorious weakness of the OA as an argument for the existence of God, candidates might embrace Barth's explanation, since it salvages the argument. On the other hand, Anselm claims that the argument does amount to a proof, and in effect calls atheists 'fools' for not accepting it, and the argument certainly reads in the form of a proof. The weakness of the argument generally stems from the force of the criticisms directed against it. Most agree that the criticisms of Kant and Hume are particularly telling, and that the focal weakness of the argument is that in the end it amounts to nothing more than a claim that <i>if</i> God exists, then he exists necessarily, which of course is true, but is of no more moment than the claim that unicorns have horns, because that is how we define unicorns. Moreover Norman Malcolm's version of the argument, however complex, still leads him to admit that the argument would not convince atheists, and that of Alvin Plantinga also fails by Plantinga's own admission that the same form of argument could also be used to define the existence of a being of maximally negative qualities. In terms of its weaknesses, then, the OA might be seen as being only a matter for faith. However some might argue that the OA still appears in new forms, so clearly it must be an issue for philosophical discussion concerning its status as an analytic proposition. Others might argue that the OA is a matter for both philosophy and faith: otherwise it seems pointless to formulate it.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Examine critically the effectiveness of the free will defence as a theodicy.</b>		
9	<p>Candidates are at liberty to justify any version of the free will defence as a theodicy, in so far as most theodicies include reference to the value of freedom in their different formulations. Augustine stresses the value of a universe with free choice; for Irenaeus/Hick, freedom is necessary for humans to choose to become children of God and to attain universal salvation; and best-possible-world theory generally acknowledges that a universe with free will in it is a better than one without it.</p> <p>Candidates should articulate some version of the FWD itself, for example that given by Mackie for the express purpose of rejecting it. This defines pain and misery as first-order evils, and happiness and pleasure as first-order goods. Second-order goods such as empathy and sympathy exist to maximise first-order goods and minimise first-order evils, whereas second-order evils such as hatred and malevolence exist to do the reverse. Freedom exists as a higher, third-order good allowing free choice between first- and second-order goods and evils, so that by being immersed in a world of free choice, people learn to choose the good and God (fourth-order Good).</p> <p>Some object that the FWD cannot account for natural evil, although this does not seem to be the case, since natural evils generate second-order goods of sympathy, compassion and courage, for example. Moreover for humans to be free, it is often argued (e.g. by Swinburne) that the universe needs to be free to follow the dictates of its own law-abiding structure (the laws of nature). Mackie's objections to the FWD hinge on his claim that the matrix of goods and evils currently stops at God, but really implies an infinite regress of fifth-, sixth-, seventh- (ad infinitum) orders of good and evil. Also, Mackie holds that an omnipotent God should be able to do the logically impossible, which includes creating beings who always make free, good choices; and since he has not done so, he does not exist. Candidates should debate a range of ideas concerning some such articulation of the FWD.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 4 New Testament – the four gospels</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
<b>Luke 11:37-48, 53–54 (NRSV)</b>		
<b>With reference to this passage, explain Jesus' criticisms of the Pharisees and the scribes (lawyers).</b>		
10(a)	<p>Candidates need to link any facts they present about the Pharisees and scribes with aspects of the passage. Expect clear reference to the role of the Law and its interpretation and why this created tension between these groups and Jesus. Expect an examination of Jesus' charges of hypocrisy. Candidates can use background information about the groups to reinforce their answer, but simple historical information without reference to the passage will only gain the lower levels.</p> <p>e.g. Jesus saw his role as helping all people while the Pharisees, who probably get their name from the word "separated", saw themselves set apart from the non-Jewish way of life. Jesus valued the Law but in a different way to the Pharisees. They saw their main role as defending the Law. This led to them overstressing certain elements to ensure that the true Law was respected. For the Pharisees the Law was sacrosanct. They defended it by drawing up and enforcing the oral tradition as a way of ensuring that the Law was not broken in any way. Jesus condemned them for their pedantry and their hypocrisy e.g. v39. The Pharisees condemned Jesus for his lax observance of the oral tradition e.g. v 38 but Jesus showed how their interpretations distorted the true meaning and purpose of God's Law e.g.v40.</p> <p>Jesus also condemned the interpretations made of the law by the scribes. The scribes copied out the law and interpreted it. They were learned men whose opinion was regularly sought about observing the Law in practical, everyday issues. Like the Pharisees, Jesus condemned them for making themselves extra-special, creating obstacles that others found difficult to adhere to and in so doing, distorting the true message of the Law e.g. v46. Jesus condemned them for being the witnesses and supporters of those who work against the messengers that God sent, the prophets e.g. v48.</p>	<b>10</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Critically assess the importance of the Sadducees in Palestine at the time of Jesus and their importance in the events surrounding Jesus' death.</b>		
10(b)	<p>Expect an evaluation of the importance of the Sadducees e.g. were they just a self-serving clique or did they protect the Jews against Roman rule? Some historical background might be included, but this should support comments about the importance of the Sadducees particularly in the role they played in the religious and political arenas and the impact they had (or did not have) on Jewish society, not simply be factual information. There should be some inclusion of the relevance and importance of the actions of the Sadducees in the condemnation of Jesus. There is no requirement that both the importance in society and their part in Jesus' death be of equal weighting, but both areas should be included to some extent.</p> <p>E.g. The Sadducees may have been named as the descendants of Zadok. They formed the high priestly caste and had great political influence in Palestine at the time of Jesus. Their focus was on religion, accepting the Torah, but not the oral tradition, and rejecting ideas like the Messiah, angels and the after-life. As members and supporters of the high priestly caste, the Sadducees worked hard to maintain the status quo, particularly trying to maintain a peaceful, at least semi-independent country. They were realists, who accepted the need to work with occupying powers but who always tried to ensure that the Jewish way of life could be maintained. Many people disagreed with their political and economic cooperation with the Romans and thought of them in the light of collaborators. But the Sadducees did try to keep the country quiet and therefore reasonably prosperous. The Sadducees were wealthy, so it was in their interest to ensure everything happened smoothly. They were willing to take whatever action was required to ensure that peace remained. When Jesus created tension in the Temple about the way the Sadducees were allowing the Temple to be misused, the Sadducees tried to destroy Jesus' reputation. The arguments about life-after death, using the example of the woman married to seven brothers, was an attempt to destroy Jesus' reputation by showing the illogicality of his teachings. This back-fired as Jesus got the better of them. In the end they felt that they had to get rid of Jesus. As Caiaphas said, "It is better for one man to die for the people, than for the whole nation to be destroyed," (John 11:49). It was the Sadducees who formed the group that sent for Jesus to be arrested, tried and handed over to Pilate. They thought they were doing something good for God and for the people, even though their tactics might be underhand. They twisted the information presented to Pilate to get their own way, particularly presenting the idea of the Messiah in a political way that would ensure Jesus' execution even though Jesus had always rejected the political overtones of the Messiah. However, they thought it was for the good of the people and so they should not be condemned too severely, even though they themselves benefited from this collaboration with Pilate as it ensured that they retained some political and financial influence in the region.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
<b>Critically assess the effectiveness of the parables in Jesus' teaching about the Kingdom of God.</b>		
11	<p>Expect some examination of the role of parables and the understanding of the Kingdom of God. It is possible to present general material supported by brief references to particular parables, with evaluation of this form of teaching, or to focus on specific parables as examples of Jesus' teaching methodology, with an assessment of the effectiveness of the chosen parables.</p> <p>E.g. One of the central elements of Jesus' teaching is the Kingdom of God or Kingdom of Heaven. There are many aspects of the kingdom that Jesus tried to convey, some of which overlap, some of which seem almost contradictory. He says that the Kingdom is close, is present and is in the future. Some people claim that it is better to think of the reign of God rather than the Kingdom of God. This would help focus on people doing the will of God now. In some ways, talking about the Kingdom of God seems to be more focused on the parousia than the here-and-now. The kingdom has to be accepted, it has to be worked for. People have to be ready to greet it when it comes in full force. Some people think that the Kingdom comes in three stages: in the teaching and ministry of Jesus, in power at the resurrection and in fullness at the end of time.</p> <p>The parables are stories made up by Jesus that usually have a single focus. Many of the parables start with the statement: "The kingdom of God is like..." There parables help people to focus on different aspects of the teaching. Their aim is to help people reflect on what Jesus has to say. As Jesus explained, the parables are there so that people may "listen and listen again but not understand" (Matthew 13:14). By this he means that people have to put effort into understanding the message and to accept it fully. (There are different interpretations of these verses which could raise alternative arguments). The teachings of the parables need to be absorbed into the individual for their purpose to be fulfilled.</p> <p>However, many of the parables are set in a very particular setting and seem directed at very specific groups, e.g. the seed parables at farmers, the fishing parables at fishermen etc. For many people, the parables lose their directness simply because they do not fully understand the imagery being used. The fact that some of the parables have explanations given to them, e.g. the sower and the seed (Matthew 13:18–23) and the weeds (Matthew 13:24–30), suggest that even early Christians had difficulty understanding the message of the parables. These explanations do not seem to be good explanations as they turn the parables into allegories and seem to destroy the immediacy of the original story. While the parables might have some impact on the mind, many people think that the actions of Jesus, including the miracles, are better ways of showing the power and the reign of God at work.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
11	The following parables are all explicitly connected with the kingdom in at least one Gospel: <i>dealing with the kingdom being present</i> : the sower and the seed, the yeast, the treasure, the pearly, the wicked tenants, the seed growing by itself, the mustard seed; <i>present and future</i> : the weeds, the dragnet, the vineyard labourers, the unforgiving debtor; <i>the future</i> : the wedding feast, the ten bridesmaids, the talents, the sheep and the goats. Other parables may be linked to the idea of the kingdom but the links must be made clear by the candidates.	

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>'The accounts of the resurrection appearances in the Synoptic Gospels have only symbolic, not historical, value.' Critically assess this claim.</b>		
12	<p>Expect some analysis of each of the Synoptic Gospels' resurrection and post-resurrection material. There should be some examination of the symbolism used which could well raise the question of the historicity of the events described.</p> <p>E.g. The inconsistencies and contradictions both within a gospel's resurrection narrative and between the different gospels raise the question whether there is any historical accuracy being presented or whether the stories are all devised to simply make theological points. Mark 16:1-8 might on the surface seem a fairly simple factual account of women going to the tomb, finding it empty and fleeing the area. However, the elements of the young man in white with the message that Jesus has risen (16:7), the message to the apostles to go to Galilee to meet Jesus and the women running away from the tomb not saying a word to anyone, all suggest that Mark worked the material to make the followers of Jesus question themselves. People need to deal with issues like: is Jesus now present with us as he told the disciples he would meet them in their home area? How do we know anything if the women didn't say anything? Does the empty tomb alone prove that Jesus has risen? Matthew's gospel seems to contain even more contradictions and illogicalities: how did the guards know it was the disciples who had stolen the body if the guards were asleep? Why were the women filled with great joy (28:8) when Mark says they were filled with fear? What was the purpose of the angels' message since Jesus himself appeared immediately? Why did the disciples meet Jesus in Galilee when Luke says he met them in Jerusalem? Does Luke's mention of the disciples not believing what the women had to say (Luke 24:11) seem more realistic and historically accurate? Does the incident on the road to Emmaus reflect a sudden awareness among small groups of disciples that Jesus is still symbolically present in the breaking of bread, rather than them actually meeting Jesus in person?</p>	<b>25</b>



Question	Answer	Marks
12	It cannot be questioned that something life-changing took place that caused the followers of Jesus to turn from being fearful to being full of joy and courage. Maybe the experience was impossible to simply put into words. Maybe the stories presented are an attempt to capture the experience in the limited way that putting anything into words makes an event lose its direct impact. There is a lot of symbolism in the Synoptic Gospels' accounts of the resurrection appearances but that does not mean that there was nothing historical and transforming underneath it.	