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MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

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This document consists of **21** printed pages.

Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Question	Answer	Marks
1(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain what Parfit means by ‘Relation R’.</p> <p>The extract comes from the end of Chapter 10 of R and P and finds Parfit summarising his position regarding ‘what we believe ourselves to be’. The inference drawn is that ‘personal identity is not what matters’, but rather ‘Relation R’ (broadly, psychological connectedness with the ‘right kind of cause’ – which could be <i>any</i> cause). Parfit distinguishes psychological connectedness (having direct psychological connections) from psychological continuity (overlapping chains of <i>strong</i> connectedness), arguing that, of the two, connectedness is more important.</p> <p>Connectedness, unlike identity, admits of degree, and can be present to <i>any</i> degree. It is thus not a <i>transitive</i> relation (thus circumventing many of the objections directed at earlier competing accounts of PI). The view is reductionist: ‘We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies, and various interrelated physical and mental events.’ Persons are not some separate entity or compound (like a Cartesian or Kantian ego) but rather more like clubs or nation states (expect illustrations here as evidence of wider reading).</p> <p>Thus, in responding to the question of ‘what we believe ourselves to be’, there may be no definitive answer. What matters, then, is not PI, but Relation R (again defined as ‘psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with the right kind of cause.’). Candidates could refer to many of the other examples and thought experiments in chapters 10–15 to evidence wider reading/ understanding of this point.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	<p>Critically assess the view that personal identity is ‘not what matters’.</p> <p>The question is broad and invites candidates to draw on knowledge of a wide range of material from chapters 10–15 of the text and beyond. This is most likely to be done via a consideration of some of the standard thought experiments within the literature (some might consider their own examples or modified versions of the above), some of which have been employed by the likes of Locke, Williams, Shoemaker, Lewis, Glover and Parfit himself, so expect colourful references to princes and cobblers, memory loss (and the breaching of the law of causal transitivity [Reid]), fugue amnesia, multiple-personality disorder, split brains, fusion, fission, teletransportation, ‘branching cases’ and ‘Freaky Fridays’, etc. Such examples should be used to test the individual necessity and joint sufficiency of competing accounts of what exactly it is that our personal identity is annexed to.</p> <p>Parfit’s own position is reductionist in character inasmuch as there is no ‘deep further fact’ about personal identity (a person is not a separately existing entity ‘distinct from brain and body, and a series of physical and mental events’). What matters is <i>Relation R</i>: broadly, psychological <i>connectedness</i> and/or continuity with the <i>right</i> kind of cause (see above). The concept of personal identity should consequently not be conceived of as a 1:1 relation, but rather as a matter of <i>degree</i> not of <i>kind</i>. Persons are capable of ‘surviving’ all sorts of qualitative and indeed numerical adjustments, and questions concerning the degree of change possible may have no determinate answers.</p> <p>What matters, then, is survival, or a suitable degree of psychological ‘connectedness’ with former and future selves (references might be made to ‘series persons’, since the conceptual and empirical possibility of fission, fusion, commissurotomy and hemispherectomy [etc.] compromise the logic of identity statements). A suitable degree of connectedness (Parfit himself is – deliberately? – vague regarding the extent of this degree) is what ‘survival’ consists in; ‘what matters’ and this ‘surprisingly natural’ way of approaching the issue has substantial implications, not just for how we ought to conceive of ourselves, but also, amongst other phenomena, morality, objects, relationships, places and nation states.</p> <p>A critical understanding of these wider implications (including the moral and political implications of his account – see, for example, arguments put forward in chapters 14 and 15 of <i>R and P</i>), whilst not necessary, should, nevertheless, also be credited, as should a critical analysis of Parfit’s own arguments (Williams <i>et al</i> – i.e. cases where we might exhibit concern for ‘disconnected’ future selves but not future connected ones). Are Parfit’s ‘intuitions’ surrounding ‘branch-line’ cases warranted? Does he successfully address the issue of whether moral obligation can be cashed out via reference to past and future selves? Etc.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>‘Cartesian substance dualism fails to solve the mind-body problem.’ Critically discuss this claim.</p> <p>To attract high marks, candidates will need to address both strands of the question via a consideration of Cartesian substance dualism itself; the nature of the mind-body problem and a judgement as to whether CD genuinely fails to address it. Cartesian substance dualism is likely to be explained as the view that minds and bodies/brains are two distinct substances with different essences (thought and extension).</p> <p>Candidates might begin by discussing the nature of substance (that which depends upon nothing else for its existence – Aristotle) and go on to discuss the differences between mental (unextended and indivisible) and physical (extended and divisible) substances as a means for discriminating between the two. Expect references to Descartes’ own arguments for this position, including the <i>cogito</i> (which establishes his essential nature as <i>res cogitans</i>); the ‘knowledge’ argument (that, whilst minds cannot be doubted, bodies can – <i>ergo</i> minds are not bodies); conceivability (that it is conceivable for minds to exist without bodies and that we conceive of their respective natures differently – both have a temporal existence, but only bodies a spatial one); and divisibility (that the body, unlike the mind, is <i>res extensa</i> and thus divisible). It is likely these arguments will be reinforced by appeal to Leibniz’ law.</p> <p>The mind-body problem, then, immediately emerges when we consider both where and how the two might interact. Some will refer to the correspondence shared between Descartes and Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia and Descartes’ own response to the problem – the pineal gland – which few have been swayed by. Further arguments that might be considered include the argument from conceivability itself (whether minds without bodies are genuinely conceivable; whether conceivability implies possibility and/or difference, etc.); whether minds are indivisible (expect references to multiple personality disorder and fugue amnesia which suggest the mind and brain/body share a far greater intimacy than Descartes’ account allows for); and bodies divisible (the standard model of physics, for example, would deny this).</p> <p>Beyond this, further <i>support</i> for the view might appeal to the incorrigibility of mental states and the irreducibility of conscious states, most notably qualia and intentionality, to matter. It is likely that candidates will endorse the view in question and objections to Descartes’ account of mind are legion, so expect references to materialism in general, other successful scientific reductions and the inescapable correspondence between minds and brains (expect references to intoxication and Alzheimer’s, etc.).</p> <p>Also, the issue of location – if the mind isn’t physical, then ‘where is it?’ – and more general issues surrounding the reification of ‘ghostly’ substances which fail to assimilate with our current physicalist paradigm.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>‘All I can know for certain is my own mind and its contents.’ Evaluate this claim.</p> <p>Candidates are being asked to discuss the problem of solipsism. They may do this by evaluating the adequacy of the argument from analogy which suggests we can justify the belief that others also have minds.</p> <p>Analogy is the comparison between two things. Analogy is used as a point of reference extensively in many areas of life. Indeed, explanations of new or complex matters are often made by using an analogy. Therefore, using analogy in the context of knowing other minds might indeed be valid.</p> <p>Reference could be made to a number of scholars who accepted the argument from analogy, such as Mill, Russell and Ayer. Analogy relies on inferential reasoning and introspection. I have first-hand sensations of my own mental states, such as pain. Indeed, many would say that such sensations are incorrigible. I am aware of what causes it, for example, a tooth infection, and how that manifests itself, for example, in one crying due to pain. Crying is empirically observable, it is public. I could therefore be justified in saying there is good reason to believe that others I meet like me are alike in having thoughts and feelings like me. That is, they have a mind, like me. We cannot observe a mind, but we can observe the behaviour of others, albeit by indirect inference.</p> <p>This inward glance or introspection suggests a private language. This can lead to Solipsism which is that all I can know is my own mind and its contents. Candidates could endorse this perspective in a number of ways. This could either be by giving arguments in favour of us only being able to know that we have a mind or by challenging the argument from analogy which says the opposite.</p> <p>Wittgenstein rejected private language. However, it can be said that when we describe our feelings in a similar way to others and vice versa, we understand each other so this language is more public than private. An argument against private language says that we do not know what our own feelings are in a way appropriate to the argument until we have learned from experience with others how to describe such feelings in appropriate language. But this then may suggest that we might be wrong when we say ‘my tooth aches’ in the same way that we might be wrong to say ‘Pete’s tooth aches.’ This conclusion is unacceptable to many.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>Malcolm followed much of Wittgenstein's approach. Malcolm argues that the first premise of the argument from analogy (I know in my own case) is problematic. To know what the conclusion 'that humans have thoughts and feelings' means, we have to know what criteria are involved in correctly or incorrectly stating that someone has thoughts or feelings. Knowledge of these criteria would make the argument from analogy either unnecessary or superfluous! He says it is a 'fundamental error' to think one learns what thoughts and feelings are from one's own case.</p> <p>As Locke suggested, it is a problem to go from one single case (me) to suggest we can then extend our knowledge to others. This is a common criticism of analogical arguments, 'the fallacy of composition'. Locke argued that analogy might work in some areas but with regard to the minds of others we cannot check. Hence, we cannot with any certainty say anything beyond that which we can say with regard to our own mind.</p> <p>Mill as an empiricist would, of course, argue that as the behaviour of others is observable, then we can check. Similarly, if we accept the standard argument from analogy, then 'like causes have like effects.' In this context, the causes are the mental states and the effects would be behaviour.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
4(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain Sartre’s claim that man is ‘without excuse’.</p> <p>It is likely, though not necessary, that candidates will contextualise their response to this question via a brief description of Sartrean ethics prior to addressing the issue itself, although responses that do not go beyond this would not be well focused.</p> <p>With this in mind, expect references to Sartre’s rejection of ‘conventional morality’ (on the grounds that any account of moral objectivity, God-given or otherwise, lacks a foundation either in nature or the divine), the notion of bad faith or ‘inauthenticity’ (‘mauvaise foi’) and his belief that our ‘existence precedes essence’. Freedom and choice, then, are inescapable features of the human condition – even a choice not to choose is a choice of sorts. Morality is thus created when we realise the magnitude of our freedom and choose accordingly.</p> <p>This is why the existentialist ‘finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist’ since, without Him, there is no ‘higher moral realm’ from which an <i>a priori</i> account of ethics might be derived (‘there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven’).</p> <p>Candidates might evidence wider reading/understanding of this point by appealing to the notions of ‘anguish’, ‘abandonment’, and ‘despair’ (also, ‘cowards’ and ‘scum’, etc.), and what exactly it is that Sartre means by these terms. It is likely that the above points will be linked to Dostoyevsky’s hypothetical proposition as ‘the starting point’ for an existentialist ethic. In God’s absence, then, everything is indeed ‘permitted’, thus ‘man is without excuse’.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
4(b)	<p>Evaluate the view that if God does not exist, everything would be permitted.</p> <p>Responses may begin by critically developing some of the material raised for discussion in their part (a) responses, so expect references to the implications of God's non-existence for human nature (or the absence of it) and morality.</p> <p>Sartre argues that, even if God were to exist, this would not affect his position since the choice to believe in Him would still have to be undertaken post-existence and presumably in bad faith. The point is contentious, and some may argue that Sartre merely assumes rather than argues for God's non-existence. Classical theistic arguments (ontological, cosmological, and teleological) might be developed here to question the legitimacy of Sartre's position, although unless directly linked to the question, such analyses would be poorly focused. Many will also refer to Kierkegaard's religious existentialism and the extent to which it is compatible with the atheistic brand laid out in E&H – might religious belief involve a 'leap of faith'?</p> <p>To attract high marks, however, both strands of the question (God's non-existence <i>and</i> its impact on Sartre's ethics) need to be considered. To do this, the validity of the inference drawn in the initial quote will need to be scrutinised in order to reach a judgement about its soundness. Candidates might appeal to evolutionary accounts of ethics here, or essentialist accounts rooted in human nature (for example, virtue ethics, natural moral law, and Kantian deontology amongst others), none of which necessarily require divine reification in order to ground an <i>a priori</i> account of moral objectivity. Thus, even if God did not exist, this would not, at least not <i>necessarily</i>, entail that everything is permitted since the dilemma Sartre presents us with is a false one.</p> <p>Some might refer to some of Sartre's own responses to these points – for example, his comments about Kant – and the extent to which these are convincing. His appeal to universal moral prescriptions (choosing for humankind, etc. – the examples he chooses are arguably poor), however, comes dangerously close to an ethic of sorts, and it would not be unreasonable to consider it, particularly regarding his appeal to good faith and authenticity, as a form of deontology. Also, whether Sartre adequately considers those individuals debilitated by circumstance in his response to the reproach that existentialism is a 'bourgeois' philosophy.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p>Critically evaluate Preference Utilitarianism.</p> <p>The safe option here, which some might take, would be to introduce the topic – preferentialism – via a discussion of utilitarianism itself, so that references might be made to more general consequentialist approaches to ethics that look to maximise utility (the greatest happiness for the greatest number and its converse). It is important, however, that candidates do not lose sight of the question, so that discussions that did not go beyond this would be characterised as having ‘isolated relevance’.</p> <p>Preference utilitarians, then, whilst accepting the principle of utility, place emphasis on the utility of personal interest rather than pleasure, and judge rightness and wrongness in terms of the maximisation, or minimisation, of the personal preferences of the agents involved in moral action. Given the subjectivity of preference, PU eschews the seemingly moral objectivity codified within other utilitarianisms and elsewhere on the grounds that no moral preference can be good or bad in and of itself (<i>pace</i> Moore). What is important, then, is the unique satisfaction of the sentient, though not necessarily rational, being (expect reference to non-rational humans and sentient animals here – i.e. conscious beings with no sense of future and non-human persons with a conception of one).</p> <p>One philosopher that might be focused on here would be RM Hare, although some candidates might refer to the earlier works of Singer (and affective altruism), Brandt on cognitive psychotherapy and perhaps Nozick’s ‘pleasure machine’ thought experiment. Candidates might discuss Hare’s distinction between intuitive and critical moral thinking and his synthesis of intuitionism with classical utilitarianism. Some might refer to meta ethical issues, too (whether or not moral propositions express ‘truths’, etc.). There are obvious strengths of the view. For one, it avoids the need to quantify pleasure seen as being a key problem for alternative hedonistic accounts.</p> <p>Singer’s emphasis on impartiality has clearly beneficial implications for practical ethics and moral decision making, although some may see this as a weakness when considering what exactly it is that constitutes a person – expect reference to the ‘two tiers’ of moral relevance here. Does a primate’s ability, for example, to express desires about future goals mean that its preferences trump those of a human foetus? What, then, of those who are unable to express a preference? Or rational individuals who have morally abhorrent preferences? Or those who express preferences that clearly are not in their own best interests (drug addicts and ‘wire-heads’, etc.). Surely there needs to be a more objective moral standard at play here in order to even recognise such cases as morally problematic to begin with.</p> <p>It might be argued that certain varieties of preferentialism – for example, Brandt’s, are better adept at handling such cases, but it is more likely that candidates will appeal to other normative theories to argue a case. To do so, candidates might refer to deontology and ideal and hedonistic utilitarianism here. Again, it is important that responses remain focused, so where alternative theories are considered, this needs to be done in order to shed critical light on PU.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>‘We have a duty to preserve life.’ Critically discuss the extent to which Kantian ethics helps in making decisions about abortion.</p> <p>There are two elements to this question, Kantian ethics and abortion, both of which will need to be considered in order to attract high marks. It is likely responses will begin with some explanatory detail, so expect a brief explanation of Kant’s deontology prior to an evaluation of whether it helps us make decisions about abortion.</p> <p>Kant’s approach to ethics stems from his initial assertion that nothing is unconditionally good except the universal <i>good will</i>. Thus, Kant’s focus is on the motives and intentions behind moral action rather than the moral outcome such actions generate (positive or otherwise): “<i>act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law of human nature</i>”. This is known as ‘the formula of universal law’ and it has clear implications for how one ought to approach the issue of abortion. In other words, before one performs an action one should ask whether it would be morally permissible if everyone consistently acted in accordance with the maxim underpinning the action: the demand for consistency being part of the demand for rationality of laws that people prescribe to themselves as rational agents.</p> <p>Kant distinguishes between <i>hypothetical imperatives</i> (one ought to do ‘X’ if one wants ‘Y’ – arguments of this form are often used to justify abortion where, for example, the rights of the mother trump those of the foetus) and <i>categorical</i> ones (simply, ‘one ought to do X’ – the form of argument often appealed to in order to condemn it – the point might be queried). It is only the latter of these which are universalisable.</p> <p>Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative (the formula of ‘the end in itself’): ‘<i>[s]o act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end</i>’ has significant moral credence given the more concrete implications of this demand for respect for persons (there are, of course, clearly non-moral cases where the hypothetical imperative still applies).</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>On this view, presumably, abortion would be impermissible since it treats the foetus as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, but the point is, of course, contentious and the issue of personhood would need fleshing out prior to reaching such a judgement. The case is not black and white and stronger candidates will display a critical awareness of this. The legitimacy of abortion, for example, in this case the deliberate termination of a pregnancy in the first half of gestation (obviously definitions change with context – a problematic point in its own right) – often turns on the moral status of the foetus.</p> <p>Given the scale of personhood, from potential, actual, diminished to ex, how candidates argue a case will depend upon how the foetus is regarded. For example, if Kant's account of human dignity and duty to oneself applies solely to actual persons, then potential persons might be excluded from the sphere of moral decision making, and so abortion, in certain cases (expect reference to rape and non-viability), might be justified.</p> <p>The account of duty Kant offers in, for example, <i>MM</i> and <i>PP&OE</i> is arguably looser than that set out in the second <i>Critique</i> and some candidates might argue that, given foetal potentiality and the inviolability of all three formulations of the categorical imperative, Kant's later work offers strong grounds for extending the application of these principles to potential persons and thus the prohibition of abortion in <i>all</i> cases.</p> <p>But again, which imperative must we follow when duties clash, whose right to life ought we to consider here, and is the imperative a moral or legal one (or both)? How would we decide, for example, the stage at which the foetus gains potentiality (at conception?), or whether the rights of the foetus trump the rights of the mother when her life is at stake (the principle of 'double effect')? Also, would respect for persons extend to non-viable foeti or foeti with congenital abnormalities?</p> <p>Such questions are far-reaching and our response to them of obvious deep importance. It would be legitimate, for example, to argue that utilitarian or virtuosic accounts of normativity offer preferable, perhaps more flexible, methods of treating such problems, but this would need to be argued for. Responses which merely list alternative approaches to the issue are unlikely to attract high marks.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry. .</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain why Amos was concerned for social justice in Israel.</p> <p>This passage follows on from the introductory section to the Book of Amos, where the prophet begins with an indictment of neighbouring nations followed by an indictment of both Israel and Judah, the focus of both being the social sins of all the nations concerned. For example, 1:6–8 condemns the Philistine cities for dealing in slavery. In 2:6, Amos turns his attention to Israel, and it is immediately apparent that he is referring to Israel’s social sins – to the ongoing and innumerable crimes committed by the wealthy ruling classes against the poor.</p> <p>By the repeated expression ‘For three transgressions ... and for four’, Amos means that the social crimes committed are ‘more than enough’ / ‘beyond the bounds of acceptable behaviour’. Where the state is expected to deal justly with its citizens, the rulers instead enlarge their own prosperity by denying justice to the oppressed: ‘they sell the righteous for silver and the needy for a pair of sandals’. In other words, they consider the poor to be worth less than the price of a pair of sandals – they can be traded in for next to nothing, so they ‘trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth’. The poor are ‘ground under the heel’ of the wealthy, whereas common decency and law require justice and fairness. Israel had experienced a long period of economic prosperity under Jeroboam II, but material goods were not shared with the less fortunate, and this ignored the national duty to look after the poor.</p> <p>The accusation that ‘father and son go in to the same girl’ appears to refer to the ritual of cultic prostitution. This practice would have led to daughters of poor families being subjected to ‘sacred’ prostitution, so that they even had to submit to the abuse of both father and son (2:7b–8). Whatever the background, the act is a social injustice to women who may have been sold into the practice by their families; moreover it profanes God’s name. Verse 8 goes on to refer to a law mentioned in Exodus 22:26–27: ‘If you take your neighbour’s cloak in pawn, you shall restore it before the sun goes down; for it may be your neighbour’s only clothing to use as cover; in what else shall that person sleep?’ The meaning appears to be that the rich profit even from garments that to the poor represent the last shreds of decency. Further, the rich go so far as to drink wines purchased presumably with fines imposed on the poor, and they do so in the house of God.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	<p>Candidates may refer to other examples of Amos' concern for social injustice in the Book, for example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4:1–3: the 'fat cows of Bashan': women who oppress the poor and crush the needy, calling upon their husbands to bring them drink. • 5:10–13: the corrupt legal practices of those who despise and intimidate honest witnesses in law cases, and who take bribes and turn aside the needy. • 8:4–6: those who cannot wait for the Sabbath to be over in order to be able to offer wheat for sale using false balances, 'buying the poor for silver ... and selling the sweepings of the wheat.' <p>Amos 5:21–24, summarises the prophet's concerns and demands: 'let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream' (v.24). Failure to do so would lead to national exile (v.27).</p> <p>The main context of Amos' concern for social justice would therefore seem to have been the threat of national destruction and exile: a punishment that materialised c.722 BCE with the Assyrian invasion of Israel.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>Critically examine what is known about the prophet Amos and the reasons for the writing of the Book of Amos.</p> <p>What is known about Amos is a matter of some debate. According to the autobiographical note in Amos 1:1, Amos was a shepherd in Tekoa, Judah, during the 8th century BCE. Tekoa is sometimes described as a poor and unimportant rural village, but 2 Chronicles 11:5–12 lists it as one of the store cities fortified by Rehoboam, so Amos might have been financially independent (and not simply a ‘poor shepherd’, as is sometimes assumed).</p> <p>Despite coming from Judah in the south, Amos prophesied in the north. Amos 7:10–13 records a confrontation between Amos and Amaziah, the official priest of the royal sanctuary in Bethel, in which Amaziah tells him to flee back to the land of Judah. He addresses Amos as <i>chozeh</i>, ‘seer’, but Amos retorts that he is neither a <i>nabi</i>/prophet nor one of the ‘sons of the prophets’, by which he apparently means that he is not a professional prophet: God took him from the flock and instructed him to prophesy to his people Israel (7:14–15). It is not clear from this, however, that Amos was <i>not</i> a professional prophet, since the phrase, ‘I <i>am</i> no prophet nor the son of a prophet’ can in Hebrew be read in the past tense: ‘I <i>was</i> no prophet nor the son of a prophet (but I am now)’.</p> <p>To summarise the above, Amos apparently came from Judah, yet he was directed to prophesy in the Northern Kingdom of Israel. He was either a poor shepherd, or else he was relatively well to do. He either had little or no desire to become a prophet, or else he was a professional <i>nabi</i> with the drive to move to the North and hurl death threats at the king and his priest (7:11–17).</p> <p>With regard to the reasons for Amos writing his book: Amos is the first known of the writing prophets. His name appears in the superscription: ‘The words of Amos, who was among the shepherds of Tekoa, which he saw concerning Israel in the days of King Uzziah of Judah and in the days of King Jeroboam son of Joash of Israel, two years before the earthquake.’ (1:1) The ‘earthquake’ appears to have occurred c.750 BCE and refers to a massive disturbance around 8.2 magnitude. Archaeological excavations across a number of sites reveal widespread damage, and it would seem likely that they were interpreted in terms of God’s actions and anger: hence ‘The Lord roars from Zion’ and ‘the top of Carmel withers’ (Amos 1:2).</p> <p>Amos 1:1 says that Amos received some form of visionary experience ‘two years before the earthquake’, but the archaeological evidence suggests that there was more than one earthquake. Amos may then have been driven to write his book on the assumption that further demonstrations of God’s wrath would follow and would destroy Israel completely. Several passages support such an interpretation, e.g. 1:3,7,10,12,14; 2:2,5; 3:13–15; 4:11; 5:8–9; 9:1).</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>It seems likely that Amos' overriding reason to write down his prophecies was to warn Israel of impending annihilation. A major theme in Israel's history is that the nation was 'elected' by God to be a chosen people – 'You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all your sins' (Amos 3:2). This appears to be the reason for Amos' prophetic call: his task was to warn Israel about the coming destruction of the nation during a time when God's anger was all too apparent.</p> <p>The content of his message is one of unmitigated doom, and its structure is characterised by a series of doom oracles. The doom oracles are introduced with the messenger formula: 'Thus says Yahweh', and are concluded by 'Oracle of Yahweh': the formula authenticating the message as coming from God himself through the medium of the prophet.</p> <p>The oracles contain an unremitting condemnation of the social and religious sins of the ruling classes, as illustrated in Question 7(a). The background to these sins lies in the prosperity brought to the Northern Kingdom by the long and successful reign of Jeroboam II (c.786–746 BCE), under whom Israel was militarily and economically powerful. Wealth made the ruling classes indifferent to the sufferings of the poor; moreover it tempted Jeroboam to give the credit for prosperity to other deities: Amos 5:26 refers to 'Sakkuth your king' and 'Kaiwan your star-god', both of these being Assyrian deities. This broke the commandment to have no other deities besides Yahweh, for which the punishment would be to undergo 'exile beyond Damascus' (5:27). Israel was invaded and destroyed by the Assyrians in 722 BCE. Amos does not mention them by name, but politically he would have been aware of the level of threat offered by Assyria.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>In his book, Amos describes the forthcoming invasion and destruction as punishment for Israel's social and religious sins. He describes the cumulative effects of social injustice and religious apostasy in various passages, and candidates are likely to refer to some of these. He describes five visions of destruction: by locusts (7:1–3); fire (7:4–6); the plumb line (7:7–9); ripe summer fruit (8:1–3); the fifth being Yahweh standing by an altar commanding a destruction from which not one of his people shall escape (9:1–4). The destruction is a negation of the 'Day of the Lord', believed by Israel to be a glorious day when Yahweh would remove all Israel's enemies. Instead, on that day, 'the sun will go down at noon and darken the earth in broad daylight' (8:9).</p> <p>The completeness of this destruction became close to historical fact when Assyria annexed the Northern Kingdom in c.722 BCE. Some might refer to the contrary message of the salvation oracle which concludes the book (Amos 9:11–15), although many scholars see this as stemming from a later revision of the 'Book of the Twelve' in which later editors allowed for future restoration.</p> <p>One further reason why Amos wrote his book is that he was banished from the Northern Kingdom by Amaziah of Bethel (Amos 7:12ff.). If he was compelled to return to Judah, then he would have been unable to complete his verbal message, so he may have completed it in written form and sent it to Israel for further digestion.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>‘The origins of Old Testament prophecy are clear.’ How far do you agree?</p> <p>Those who agree with the statement are likely to point to the origins of Old Testament prophecy in the figure of Moses. Moses in the Pentateuch is portrayed as the prophet/leader whose call, vocation and power were a formative model for the prophets who came after him. Moses forms a bridge between the world of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and that of the Hebrew ancestors who were used as slave-labour in the construction of the Egyptian store-cities of Pithom and Raamses (Exodus 1:11).</p> <p>Moses experiences a formative call to be the prophet to deliver the slaves from captivity. He demonstrates miraculous powers to save them from Pharaoh’s army by dividing the waters of the sea, and speaks with Yahweh to guide them in the wilderness before the entry into Canaan. Numbers 11 appears to credit Moses with the origins of ‘ecstatic’ prophecy, whereby the prophet operates in an abnormal psychological state to understand and deliver God’s word: ecstasy in this account is contagious, a phenomenon described, for example, in 1 Samuel 10, in connection with Saul. Moses is also seen as the receiver of the covenant law-code, and later prophets saw obedience to this code as the measure of a king’s status and success. As a final comment here, in Deuteronomy 18 Moses says that where, in the future, there is a need to reveal God’s will, then God will raise up ‘a prophet like him’ (v.18). This portrait seems to depict clearly Moses as the archetypal prophet who stood as a role model for later prophets.</p> <p>However, some will point out that, to many commentators, this portrait is ideal rather than real. Modern scholarship tends to see Moses as a composite or fictional character developed to unify Israel’s understanding of its own origins and nature. On this kind of approach, the origins of Old Testament prophecy are more likely to be sought in the wider Ancient Near Eastern context. For example, some will point out the similarities with accounts of prophets at Mari, on the Euphrates, where a variety of 18th century BCE texts show different types of oracle with some similarities to later Israelite prophecy, including ecstatic behaviour. This might provide reasonable evidence of an influence on Old Testament prophecy, but it does not explain its origin. Some see Old Testament prophecy as being a cultural absorption from prophecy in Canaan, for example, based on worship of the deity Baal, who is referred to frequently in biblical texts.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>Some argue that prophecy in the land of Israel developed specifically in relation to the monarchy. Israel's military appears to have been organised through the cooperation of the tribes against an external threat. One major threat was posed by Philistine aggression, and the prophet Samuel anointed Saul, and then David, as the first two kings of Israel, to contain that threat. This raises the possibility that prophecy and monarchy developed simultaneously: kings were needed to unify and coordinate the Israelite tribes, and prophets were needed to control the power of the king (by maintaining that God was king overall).</p> <p>The biblical portrait of Samuel varies, however. In 1 Samuel 9:1–10:16, he is not the effective ruler of Israel but is a local man of God (9:6); a respected seer/clairvoyant (<i>roeh</i>) (9:9), the leader of a hill-top 'band of prophets' (10:5–6). Further, 9:9 contains an editorial note that 'he who is now called a <i>nabi</i> (prophet) was formerly called a <i>roeh</i> (seer), which raises the possibility that prophecy in Israel began with the seers / clairvoyants and developed into nabis / prophets who advocated the worship of Yahweh.</p> <p>Some might conclude that there are too many unknown factors to allow the origins of Old Testament prophecy to be known 'clearly'. Many hold that the Old Testament scriptures as a whole derive (at the earliest) from the period of the 6th century Babylonian exile, and that they present a connected narrative back into a past which has little or no historical basis.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>Critically assess the problem of false prophecy in Israel.</p> <p>False prophecy can refer to cultic prophets and court prophets who were paid to reassure people, and hence led the people astray. It can also be linked to the issue of how the recipients of any particular prophecy can know that the prophet in question is supported by the authority claimed (i.e. God), and whether the content of the prophecy is reliable, for example if the prophecy refers to a future prediction.</p> <p>Issues such as these appear throughout the biblical narratives. For example, Deuteronomy 18 prohibits what it sees as superstition and magic of the kind practised in Canaan, e.g. divination, soothsaying, augury, sorcery, and being a charmer or a medium or a wizard or a necromancer, since these things are an abomination to God (18:9–14). Moses reassures the Israelites that when a problem arises, God will raise up for them a prophet like him; and should anyone claim falsely to speak a word in God’s name, then that prophet will die. Moreover the test of the truth of anyone claiming to prophesy in Yahweh’s name is if the word comes to pass (18:15–22). There are two obvious problems here: (1) the word might come to pass at some future time, so how would the recipients know how long to wait for the fulfilment or failure of a prediction? (2) The acceptance of any prophetic word depends on accepting the belief system from which it derives. What if the belief system is false?</p> <p>Many of the criteria for distinguishing between true and false prophets are found in the Book of Jeremiah. For example, Jeremiah ridicules the scribes who falsify scripture by misunderstanding it: they have rejected the ‘living’ prophetic word of Yahweh (Jeremiah 8:8–9). Moreover, so-called prophets and priests deal falsely by proclaiming ‘Peace, peace, when there is no peace’ (8:11). In Jeremiah 28:8–9, whilst confronting the ‘false’ prophet Hananiah, Jeremiah makes a strong claim: ‘The prophets who preceded you and me from ancient times prophesied war, famine, and pestilence against many countries and great kingdoms. As for the prophet who prophesies peace, when the word of that prophet comes true, then it will be known that the LORD has truly sent the prophet.’ According to Jeremiah, then, there is no context for Shalom (peace) prophecy, because the conduct of Israel and Judah merits only doom and destruction.</p> <p>Some regard this as a strong criterion for identifying a true prophet, although it faces the problem that salvation oracles do occur in the prophetic writings, such as those found in the Book of the Twelve. A counter to that, however, is that the Book of the Twelve seems to have been edited to include salvation oracles (e.g. Amos 9:11–15), presumably to encourage hope for the future.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>Another attempt to distinguish between true and false prophets is the claim that false prophets worked within the cult, whereas true prophets did not. This is problematic in the extreme. According to the texts, Moses operated within the cult; so did Samuel; Isaiah of Jerusalem received his call within the Jerusalem Temple; the structure of Jeremiah's 'confessions' read in part like cultic oracles; and so on. Similarly, some claim that false prophets prophesied for money, but this would condemn all prophets who operated in the king's court, such as Nathan and Gad, who would certainly have been paid but can hardly be condemned as uniformly false.</p> <p>Some might argue that only true prophets received a call, but we have no means of testing that as a criterion: the mental processes of others are not open to scrutiny. Some might claim that only true prophets used messenger formulae ('Thus says Yahweh', etc.), but these were used by others, e.g. Hananiah (Jeremiah 28:11). Prophets such as Jeremiah and Amos claimed to stand in God's heavenly council, and to hear its words. On this basis, for example, Jeremiah asks, concerning the false prophets, '...Who among them has stood in the council of the Lord so as to see and hear his word?'</p> <p>This statement appears to say that true prophets literally saw and/or heard the deliberations of Yahweh's council; but the narrative in 1 Kings 22 underlines the problematic nature of all the criteria used to distinguish between true and false prophets. 1 Kings 22 details the confrontation between the 'true' prophet Micaiah ben Imlah on the one hand and the four hundred 'false' court prophets of King Ahab on the other. The story appears to explain the problem of false prophecy by suggesting that it is controlled by Yahweh, who in this case summons 'a spirit of lying prophecy' to deceive Ahab (1 Kings 22:19–23), which in effect suggests that in any given situation 'false' prophecy is as true as 'true' prophecy, which is a difficult argument to accept.</p> <p>Some might conclude that there are so many unknown factors concerning the compilation of the Old Testament books that it is not possible to make definitive statements about this or any other question.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	